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Today I begin a đŸ§” on new, striking immigration research.

First, in a long thread:

LĂ©a Marchal et al. meta-analyze 2,146 estimated effects of immigration on native wages. Average almost exactly zero, across skill levels.

Novel result: publication bias favors negative estimates.

leamarchal.fr/wp-content/uploa


This entry was edited (10 months ago)
in reply to Michael Clemens

The US earnings gap between third-generation Mexican-American men and non-Mexican whites is about half as large today as in 1940.

Prior estimates, lacking full-count census data, have missed this progress by missing the best-integrated Mexican Americans.

Kosack+Ward—> doi.org/10.1017/S0022050720000


in reply to Michael Clemens

Perceptions reign:

County-level unauthorized US immigration reduces native employment *in migrant-intensive sectors*, & shifts local expenditure from education to policing



but null effects on unemployment, wages, crime rates

Tiburcio+Camarena: ernestotiburcio.files.wordpres


in reply to Michael Clemens

Do ethnic enclaves prevent economic integration by new immigrants, or serve as a gateway to greater integration?

In Sweden 2000–2010, enclaves help—when residents are employed. Integration of earlier arrivals makes them an engine of new integration.

Kadarik et al.—> doi.org/10.1177/0308518X219897


in reply to Michael Clemens

When people with xenophobic beliefs perceive those beliefs as widespread, they are more likely to express xenophobia



but also: People who *disagree* with those beliefs are less likely to sanction expressions of xenophobia

By Bursztyn+Egorov+Fiorin —> doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171175

in reply to Michael Clemens

Having forced migrants in your family *or* local community — generations ago — is correlated with pro-refugee attitudes and behaviors today, in Germany and Greece.

By Dinas, Fouka, & SchlĂ€pfer —> doi.org/10.1086/710016

in reply to Michael Clemens

Continuing đŸ§” of new migration research:

In a novel randomized evaluation, standalone English-language training for adult immigrants in the US


—Causes ↑ 56% in annual earnings (years 2–10)

—Has +6% ROI for public purse via ↑ tax revenue

By Heller+Slungaard Mumma—> doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210336 #LaborEcon

in reply to Michael Clemens

In fiscal 2023, the largest single nationality of migrant encountered at the US southwest border—apart from Mexicans—was Venezuelans.

Using Venezuelans' spatial settlement patterns, Gunadi tests and fails to detect impacts on native labor force outcomes, at any skill level—> doi.org/10.1111/obes.12455

in reply to Michael Clemens

Greater exposure to foreign-born classmates causes ↑ native math+reading test scores, greatest ↑ for black students

Uses *within household* variation, full universe K–12 data from Florida 2002–2012

Forthcoming in REStud by Figlio et al.—>

nber.org/papers/w28596 #immigration

in reply to Michael Clemens

In the Netherlands, natives 8% less likely to cooperate with a non-Western immigrant, in second stage of a trust game, if immigrant trusts the native

In other words, the returns to being trustworthy are lower for the immigrant

By Cettolin+Suetens in EJ—> doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12629 #immigration

in reply to Michael Clemens

Immigration-driven increases in ethnic/occupational diversity—measured by surname diversity in full-universe census—caused ↑ innovation in US counties, 1850–1940

Not compositional: robust to surname FE

Simply meeting more people unlike oneself causes more new economic ideas measured as patents, including 'breakthrough' highly-cited patents

By my star GMU colleague Jonathan Schulz, +Posch & Henrich—>

dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.453120
 #LaborEcon #Immigration

in reply to Michael Clemens

Does immigration cause reduced support for social policy?

73 research teams—using identical data—reached vastly different estimates.

"Researchers must make analytical decisions so minute that they often do not even register as decisions."

Breznau et al.—> doi.org/10.1073/pnas.220315011
 #immigration #laborecon

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