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Real time collaboration software and text boxes that rapidly save drafts to the cloud essentially log your fingerprintable typing behavior. The industry refers to this information as “keystroke dynamics” or “typing biometrics”.

Other modern “operator signatures” are easier to minimize. A user can learn to obfuscate writing style, or can use keyboard navigation with different pointing devices to limit fingerprinting of mouse behavior.

Keystroke biometrics are difficult to anonymize without installing software such as kloak or browser extensions (the latter of which may add fingerprintable vectors) designed to cloak some of your typing habits. Signature typos, approximate typing speed, etc. will still leak. Alternatively, we could normalize typing messages out in a simple offline editors that don’t store revision history before pasting them into other input fields.


Originally posted on seirdy.one: See Original (POSSE). #Privacy #Anonymity

This entry was edited (1 month ago)

Tamas G reshared this.

in reply to Seirdy

Updated the link to kloak to point to Whonix’ more active fork.
in reply to Seirdy

Would any editor with an undo history apply as well?

Even for the case of vim, where (I'm not familiar with how history is really stored, only guessing that) undo checkpoints are determined by switching from insert to normal mode, there is still fingerprintable information in how often and where someone switches to normal mode.

in reply to ~hedy

@hedy Strictly speaking, yes. But since it’s stored offline I’m less worried. I’d be even less worried if programs on Linux were sandboxed properly by default and had runtime permissions to view shared filesystems.