@Yuvalne if jurisdiction would not matter then Signal wouldn't threaten to pull out of Europe if the EU goes for #chatcontrol . True, jurisdiction for a server can not decrypt E2EE messages but it can attack services as a whole, or demand metadata info (which account ID belongs to which phone number etc.) behind the scenes.
And you know what's worst about all this, after delving even deeper into the subject? That it would de facto be the end of *all* privacy ๐ซ๐ Because, in reality, this law assumes the scanning of everything sent from our device, not just messages, as is usually said. That's the worst part. That this law normally seems bad because it will scan our messages. But the truth is, this law is the devil because it will scan everything
It is not even able to scan for harmful content. It is impossible to differentiate between legitimate nudes or abusive ones. As well as it is impossible to differentiate grooming vs flirting simply by the chat content. #chatcontrol is a huge scam!! Only practical use-case is mass surveillance and information control.
European SMEs have united to direct a strong open letter to urge ministers of EU member states to oppose Chat Control and to defend privacy and a strong European tech industry.
As we speak, the EU is debating a law called "Chat Control". For now, the vote on Chat Control has been postponed, but should this law pass - what would it mean for your security and privacy?
At first glance, it's about combating child abuse on the โฆ
But we must keep fighting. ๐ช @all_things_secured_channel interviewed Hanna on the current status of Chat Control, whether it's coming back, and why you should care - even if you're not in the EU.
For the past few months, the EU has been on a mission to break privacy and end-to-end encryption in the name of child safety. Here's what this means for you, even if you're not an EU citizen.
Irelandโs Minister for Justice stated that they wish to introduce domestic legislation that would give Irish police (An Garda Sรญochรกna) access to encrypted messaging services.
Side point on #ChatControl: When I worked on the law in the European Parliament, in the face of questionably legal, and highly problematic behavior by DG HOME, I prepared a whitepaper on why it was such a terrible Idea.
As it is in the public interest, I have decided to make that white paper public.
๐ช๐บGermany's Minister of Justice today: "Suspicionless #ChatControl must be taboo in a state governed by the rule of law." Private communication cannot be placed under general suspicion. "Germany will not agree to such proposals at the EU level." bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Zitate/DE/2โฆ
On 14 October, the EU Council will vote on the CSA Regulation โ legislation that would require email and messaging services to automatically scan private messages. Without cause, without suspicion.
Together with other European tech companies, we've signed an open letter.
๐ช๐บ If you already contacted your MEPs: Contact your local media TODAY to ask them to report and inform on the dangers of Chat Control.
๐ If you are not European: Spread the word! Talk about it on social media. Contact your local media. Contact your representatives to share your concerns about similar proposals and the loss of privacy rights. This would affect you too!
This is an urgent matter. We cannot let the West slip in this authoritarian dystopia. We must stop Chat Control โ๐
๐ช๐บGermany's Interior Ministry is pushing a sham amendment to bully the ๐ฉ๐ช coalition into approving #ChatControl on Tuesday - securing a Council majority. Total trick: patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/chaโฆ
@delta I am not sure to understand your argument well. So I understand (perhaps not correctly) the idea of โโthis time with #ChatControl is that the messages are scanned on the client's side, and before that the infrastructure does not matter. I will avoid that restriction but the vast majority of people do not do it. If they do not scan my device they will do it in the person with whom I communicate. It would be a lost battle.
well, we appreciate Signal trying to make a difference with its public weight ahead of the oct14 chat control vote. Yes, Signal is centralized and running on gafam servers but it also was a key leading effort to make e2ee UX widely available ... and that is fundamentally threatened by #chatcontrol. Federated #xmpp or #email servers do not help against legislation that aims at apps and clients. This is a time to put all of our joint weight against chatcontrol, not gamble for exceptions.
But Daniel, you might ask, won't the criminals just use Conversations then? Yes, they already do. And thank you for realizing why chat control is stupid.
EU Chat Control won't apply to the federated Jabber/XMPP ecosystem. #Conversations_im is used by various militaries, police forces and intelligence agencies in Europe. They will make sure it won't get any client side scanning.
๐ฉ๐ช Today we celebrate #GermanUnityDay โ a victory over oppression & mass surveillance.
But history warns us: #ChatControl could bring surveillance back at a scale East Germany could only have dreamed of. It's like putting a spy in every phone with AI as judge.
Letโs defend freedom & say NO to #ChatControl! โ
The division of Germany was accompanied by mass surveillance in East Germany and the suppression of the opposition. This should serve as a lesson to us as to why Chat Control must never be allowed.
While #chatcontrol poses an existential threat to the Freiburg merlinux GmbH and distributing #deltachat apps from within the EU to all stores worldwide, it would resist any chatcontrol legislation up to the German constitutional and EuGH courts.
If the EU based company would need to fold in a few years, there would likely be forks distributed outside the EU that will *seamlessly* continue to function. Our architecture and FOSS licensing makes sure of it. See also chaos.social/@delta/1134177407โฆ
We consider our efforts aligned: #deltachat #chatmail and #webxdc implement "right to exit" on all levels of our decentralized messaging project.
- deploy your own servers permission free and interoperable with all e-mail servers ("federation mast") - all apps and libraries and server components are 100% Foss - interactive chat-shared web-apps can be used in other messengers
When Russia implements mass surveillance, we shake our heads and call Russia a dictator ruled country. When EU wants to do the same, it is "for the children" and it is expected that everyone nods their heads in approval.
This is so spot-on!
I'm happy they have received over 55.000 votes so far. 50.000 votes from citizens who can vote in Danish parliament elections are needed to get this proposal processed in the Danish parliament.
Now I just hope those 55.000+ votes so far are 100% valid votes. And I hope this proposal will double in the days to come.
Opposition to Chat Control within Denmark is growing. Fast. If you are a Danish citizen, please consider signing the Chat Control petition: borgerforslag.dk/se-og-stoet-fโฆ
At 50 000 signatures, it is automatically submitted to the parliament and undergoes the standard legislative process, including potential debates, review, and vote.
Vi beder Danmark om at stemme nej til EUโs โChatkontrolโ en lov, der pรฅlรฆgger masseovervรฅgning af alle borgere ved at scanne private beskeder, e-mails
The EU Regulation to Prevent and Combat Child Sexual Abuse, first published in May 2022, has become the "most criticized law of all time". Here's how to stop it now!
#chatcontrol is a giant legal-technical quagmire and would erode privacy in times where we most need it. But let's talk about protecting children ... what chatcontrol claims to be about:
First, it's unproven that chatcontrol would help lower actual abuses.
Second, why not spend the many EU millions that go into busying politicians, developers, lawyers and orgs into hiring social workers? They could directly act on the huge backlog of _reported known_ child abuse cases. That definitely helps.
The problem with #chatcontrol is deep and extremely significant. It would be a paradigm shift that implies state and corporate control of app developers and users, i.e. what you can install on "your" devices. It would empower Google, Apple and Microsoft to increase enclosure even more.
Just as with the p2p wealth of good tools two decades ago, e2e tooling would remain available only to small specialist circles.
Given authoritarian threats everywhere, #chatcontrol is an exceptionally bad idea.
๐ฌ๐ง๐Estonia won't be approving #ChatControl either. ๐But Germany's vote on Oct. 14th is still up in the air, risk of a dangerous coalition compromise. ๐ช28 days left to increase the pressure on your government and defend digital privacy and security: chatcontrol.eu
๐ซ๐ท French: Traduction du dossier Chat Control 2.0 ๐ธ๐ช Swedish: Chat Control 2.0๐ณ๐ฑ Dutch: Chatcontrole
The End of the Privacy of Digital Correspondence
Take action to stop Chat Control now!
The Chat Control 2.
Danish Minister of Justice and chief architect of the current Chat Control proposal, Peter Hummelgaard: "๐ช๐ฒ ๐บ๐๐๐ ๐ฏ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ธ ๐๐ถ๐๐ต ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ผ๐๐ฎ๐น๐น๐ ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ป๐ฒ๐ผ๐๐ ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐ฒ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ผ๐ป๐ฒ'๐ ๐ฐ๐ถ๐๐ถ๐น ๐น๐ถ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ ๐๐ผ ๐ฐ๐ผ๐บ๐บ๐๐ป๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐๐ฒ ๐ผ๐ป ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฟ๐๐ฝ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐บ๐ฒ๐๐๐ฎ๐ด๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐."
We have to keep fighting for #encryption and our right to #privacy ๐
The EU Regulation to Prevent and Combat Child Sexual Abuse, first published in May 2022, has become the "most criticized law of all time". Here's how to stop it now!
a #ChatControl update (shared on the ISOC "Global Encryption Coalition" mailing list):
"The good news is that the blocking minority held. Members states raised concerns about privacy and cybersecurity as reasons for their opposition. Even countries that are officially in support of the proposal asked questions along these lines for the first time โ showing that they are facing increased pressure back home.
The bad news is that #Denmark is moving forward even though they did not receive full support. They are keeping their plan to take this proposal to the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting on October 14th.
After discussing with partners, we understand this as a strategy from Denmark. They are not making progress at the working level (the meeting today) and therefore will try directly at the political level (justice and home affairs). During these coming four weeks they will try to convince some of the blocking member states to reconsider their position.
What this means for us is that we need to keep up the pressure. We should be thanking the blocking countries for their position and encouraging the undecided or supportive countries to reconsider. We should keep up pressure in the media at the same time."
As #ChatControl marches on, we already know what the European Court of Human Rights has ruled in a similar case against RUSSIA: "The Court concludes that in the present case the [..] obligation to decrypt end-to-end encrypted communications risks amounting to a requirement that providers of such services weaken the encryption mechanism for all users; it is accordingly not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued". Yet we continue to try just that... For shame. hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2โฆ
The HUDOC database provides access to the case-law of the Court (Grand Chamber, Chamber and Committee judgments and decisions, communicated cases, advisory opinions and legal summaries from the Case-Law Information Note), the European Commission of Hโฆ
